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By Stéphane Dion and Éloi Laurent2 
“The door is closing. I am very worried – if we don’t change direction now on how
we use energy, we will end up beyond what scientists tell us is the minimum (for
safety). The door will be closed forever.” 
(Fatih Birol, Chief Economist, International Energy Agency, “International Agency
Gives Us Five Years to Deal with Climate Change”, The Guardian, December 28, 2011)
Two decades after the 1992 Rio Conference, we must admit to collective failure
in combating human-induced climate change. The problem is not that no efforts
have been undertaken, but that these efforts have just not been enough. We
cannot escape serious climate disruption – which, to some extent, has already
begun – if we keep going down that road. We must change direction, and we must
move quickly.
To this end, we call in this paper for a fine-tuning of the international negotia-
tions on climate. We propose refocusing these international efforts on negotiating
a global carbon price signal, harmonized in principle but flexible in practice,
instead of doggedly spending the next few years attempting to convince countries
to accept stricter national targets for quantitative reduction of their greenhouse gas
(GHG) emissions. We cannot afford to spend the next few years missing the wrong
targets.
Simply put, we must move away, collectively, from an ineffective logic of
constraint to a pragmatic logic of price incentives.
1. The authors wish to acknowledge the insightful comments received from participants at a presentation given
by Éloi Laurent at the European Climate Foundation in Brussels.
2. Stéphane Dion is a Member of the House of Commons of Canada; as Canada’s then Minister of the
Environment, he chaired the 11th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change (COP 11), held in Montréal in 2005. Éloi Laurent is a senior economist and scientific advisor at the
Observatoire français des conjonctures économiques (OFCE), and a professor at Sciences Po (Paris) and at Stanford
University.Working papers OFCE –  2012-16 (May 2012)
Stéphane Dion and Éloi Laurent2The December 2011 Durban Conference proved, once again, that the “to each
their own target” approach does not work. We must instead adopt a “one price
signal for all” strategy.
If there were a single reason to improve the current mitigation logic, it would be
this evident fact: developing countries, which now account for 60% of emissions
worldwide, cannot accept what they perceive as an obstacle to their economic
development, when developed countries have been able to get rich on unlimited
use of fossil fuel energy. Indeed, in the foreseeable future, emerging economies,
particularly China and India with Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annual growth
rates of between 8% and 10%, will not accept absolute reduction targets
for GHG emissions. On the other hand, these countries might be more open to the
idea of a flexible levy of a price per tonne of carbon dioxide, a price from which
they would derive revenues, and which their economic competitors would also be
required to levy.
What we are proposing here is nothing revolutionary: for years, many experts
and analysts – such as well-known climate economists William Nordhaus (Yale
University) and Nick Stern (LSE), and, more recently, climate scientist Jim Hansen
and co-authors – have called for the adoption of such a universal, harmonized
carbon price. So has the OECD which recommends “Acting now to put a price on
carbon”3. The value-added of our proposal lies in its simplicity and, we hope, its
didactic value. 
1. The great climate inconsistency: galloping threat, failing international 
system
Objectively speaking, the state of the climate is worrisome: while we cannot
assess all the repercussions, we are entering the murky zone of increased global
warming of 3°C (relative to the pre-industrial era) by the end of the 21st century.
In theory, the objective of a 2º C limit on increased global warming – a limit
considered safe for human societies – could still be reached. However, given
current GHG emissions and future emissions from existing facilities over their life
cycle (for example, coal-fired electricity generating stations, factories, buildings
and vehicles), this limit appears to be already unduly optimistic. Available studies
concur that all voluntary commitments made by countries since the
December 2007 Bali Conference, taken together, point to warming of at
least 3º C during the 21st century. The International Energy Agency (IEA)4 fore-
casts warming of over 3.5º C by the end of the 21st century if all countries respect
their commitments, and warming of over 6º C if they do not respect their commit-
ments and content themselves with their present policies5.  At that level of
3. OECD, OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050, 2012,  p. 111.
4. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011, p. 210.
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living species – plant and animal: our planet will become much less hospitable to
virtually all forms of life.
A great many studies6 warn that climate warming of between 3º and 4º – the
most likely outcome today – would jeopardize the survival of between 40%
and 70% of plant and animal species; possibly lower crops in most regions, parti-
cularly in Africa; contribute to glacier retreat; dangerously dry up freshwater
sources and precipitation, particularly in southern Europe, Central Asia, Africa and
South America; and raise the sea level by possibly one metre. Given the acidifica-
tion of carbon dioxide-saturated oceans, there would be massive dissolving of coral
and potential disruption of the entire marine food chain. As well, the feedback
effect could cause warming to accelerate under its own impetus, with such effects
as hastening the release of methane, a powerful GHG now immobilized in oceans
and permafrost.
For 20 years now, beginning with the Convention on Climate Change resulting
from the 1992 Rio Conference, the international community has worked hard to
take this very real threat seriously. Not only did countries accept the objective of
limiting global warming to 2º C at the 2012 Cancún Conference; they also
expressed “grave concern” about the gap between their own commitments and
achieving this objective of a 2º C limit on increased global warming, in the
preamble to their common statement at the December 2011 Durban Conference.
They promised to “raise the level of ambition” to bridge this gap. But only one
country at the Durban Conference – Denmark – made a commitment to achieving
a more stringent objective. Nor does the Durban common statement set out any
target date by which emission reductions must begin, or any global emission reduc-
tion objectives for 2020 or 2050. 
In fact, in Durban, countries were able to agree only on a plan to reach an agree-
ment, no later than 2015, for action to assemble all countries under the same legal
system – to begin only in 2020. The very terms of this agreement are disquietingly
vague: “a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome
with legal force under the Convention applicable to all Parties.’’ Even Christina Figueres,
5. If countries limit themselves to respecting their present commitments, warming by the end of the 21st century
will be between 2.5º C and 5º C according to the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) (Bridging the
Emission Gap: A UNEP Synthesis Report, 2010); between 2.9º C and 4.4º C according to the Climate Action Tracker
(update, 11 December 2011); and between 3.5º C and 5º C according to Climate Interactive. The most recent
forecasts conducted in anticipation of the next (2013-2014) Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) report are for warming of between 2º C and 5º C. It should be noted that these forecasts assume
that countries will reach their most demanding emission reduction targets (for example, by 2020 Europe will
reduce its emissions by 30%, not just 20%), and assumes that no promised emission reductions are counted twice.
However, a number of countries have noted that their emission reduction targets were conditional on the signing
of a binding international treaty taking over from Phase 1 of the Kyoto Protocol, to end in 2012. At present such an
international treaty is more uncertain than ever. 
6. Climate Action Tracker, "After Durban: Risk of Delay in Raising Ambition Lowers Chances for 2º C, while
Heading for 3.5º C"; see also: OECD, OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050, 2012, p. 86-89.
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regretfully agreed that “What [the agreement] means has yet to be decided.”
Although the Kyoto Protocol was indeed extended until 2017, Japan, Russia and
Canada refused to accept new quantitative emission reduction targets; and Canada
even announced that it would withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol following the
Durban Conference. The European Union – here, once again, the only responsible
developed power as far as climate is concerned – proposed, at the last moment,
that countries consider adopting a new treaty that might be signed in 2015 and
come into force in 2020.
This deadlock on reduction targets impacts all aspects of negotiations. That is
the case for the funding that was promised to developing countries to help them
deal with climate change. We do have an agreement on a collective objective (100
Billion dollars per year beginning in 2020) but nobody knows how much each
developed country will have to contribute. 
Countries are also seeking progress toward the establishment of a strategy to
curb deforestation, named REDD-plus (“Reducing Emissions from Deforestation
and Forest Degradation”). According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, finan-
cing the REDD mechanism for forest management alone would cost 25 billion
dollars per year to reduce deforestation by 50% by 2020. Again, nobody knows
where the money will come from. 
Collectively, thus, we are facing what can be called a “great climate inconsis-
tency”:  an increasingly untenable gap between the urgency of taking action and
the inertia of international negotiations. Contrasting with the timidity of the
Cancún and Durban agreements, the IEA emphasizes that global emissions must be
capped starting in 2017 and must begin dropping in subsequent years for
the “450 ppm scenario” to be possible7. 
Hence, the reason for our proposal is quite simple: we want to help find a prac-
tical solution to our shared heedlessness, and a way out of the great climate
inconsistency that worsens as we watch. Some might call our proposal unrealistic.
But given the current state of climate negotiations, we might ask back: who is really
being unrealistic?
7. It is generally acknowledged that, for there to be a reasonable (50%) chance of limiting global warming to less
than 2º C, the GHG level in the atmosphere would have to be limited to 450 parts per million (ppm). At present
the estimated GHG level is 380 ppm, that is 100 ppm more than during the pre-industrial era. At its present rate,
the GHG level is increasing by more than 2 ppm each year. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) and the IEA warn that the "450 ppm scenario" will be impossible unless global emissions are
capped starting in 2017 and begin to drop in subsequent years (OECD/IEA, Green Growth Studies: Energy,
2011, p. 19). If no changes are made by 2017, all allowable emissions under the 450 ppm scenario will include
those of existing facilities, with the result that electricity generating stations, factories, buildings, vehicles,
electrical household appliances and farm equipment coming onstream after 2017 would be allowed no carbon
emissions.
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surrender in the face of global crisis. The global financial crisis is actually not a
valid reason to back off in the name of so-called "realism". Instead, it should encou-
rage us to raise the level of effort: according to the IEA, every dollar not invested to
combat climate change in the present decade will cost $4.30 after 2020, to offset
increased emissions. At a time when global economic growth is very fragile and
public finances have deteriorated in many of the world’s economies, do we really
want to pay four times as much in future for our present carelessness?
Box: Understanding precisely our collective failure in order to learn from it
Although laudable and still quite recent, the present international efforts to combat
climate change are evidently failing. Four main problems explain this collective failure.
A problem of effectiveness: The instruments now being used do not allow us to contain the
dynamics of global GHG emissions. These emissions have ballooned since 1990 (increases
in the order of 50%) and were barely reduced by the major recession of 2008-2009 (carbon
dioxide emissions decreased only slightly, by 1.4%, from 2008 to 2009 and increased
by 5.8% in 2010). Thus the current emissions dynamic is diametrically opposed to what
science recommends: since the Rio Conference, the annual rate of emission has jumped
from 1% in 1990-2000 to 3.1% in 2000-2010.
A problem of transparency: The quantitative target of emissions in volume approach lends
itself to various biases that distort climate performance of countries. For example, the
selected reference date (generally 1990) is problematic for countries of the former Soviet
Union, many of which have since joined the European Union.  Performance is apparently
good for the developed countries listed in Annex I of the Kyoto Protocol and taken as a
whole, with emissions today lower by 8% than in 1990, an even better performance than
the collective target of - 5.2%. But, in fact, while Russia and the other countries of the
former Soviet Union decreased their emissions, developed countries such as the United
States and Japan increased theirs. Furthermore, the Kyoto Protocol only accounts for produc-
tion emissions (resulting from production within the borders of a given country) but not
consumption emissions (those that result from production by one country included in
products consumed in another country) even while the latter are growing at a much faster
pace in developed countries.
A problem of inclusion: An international climate agreement must absolutely include all the
large GHG emitters, starting with the emerging economies (China became the world’s
largest GHG emitter in 2007 and now accounts for close to a quarter of global emissions). 
A problem of incentive: Developing countries perceive emission reductions as a “carbon
constraint” that unfairly hinders their economic development; in times of economic crisis,
quantitative targets can become hard for developed countries to accept as well.
It is our belief that any proposed reform intending to go beyond the present international
climate negotiation system must offer solutions to these four problems.
Stéphane Dion and Éloi Laurent62. Local initiatives as a way out of global deadlock: necessary, 
but not sufficient
Given this admission of collective failure on the climate front, should we write
off the objective of an international climate agreement? That is the conclusion of
the self-described “pragmatic” school of thoughts on climate mitigation. The
report entitled Climate Pragmatism, the result of a meeting between authors from
the Breakthrough Institute and the Hartwell Group8, argues that international
agreements are only the sum of the political will of participating countries and
thus cannot force governments to do things they do not wish to do. 
Pragmatism, according to these authors, suggests we admit that the “carbon
war” can never be won; at most, it can be better managed. Instead of a war, they
thus suggest a “guerrilla campaign”, waged differently with different targets in
every country and every industry, based on authentic grassroots support and
adapted to issues such as retrofitting, energy efficiency, forest management, biodi-
versity protection and air cleanup. The resulting cumulative specific victories
would take us, they argue, farther than the illusory pursuit of a comprehensive
climate treaty.
We, of course, agree that stalled international negotiations must not result in a
slowing down of efforts made by countries, regions, cities and the private sector. It
cannot be denied that many countries, localities and businesses are making serious
efforts to promote sustainable development, sometimes with impressive results,
and that these local initiatives are to be encouraged in accordance with the “poly-
centric approach” posited by Nobel Prize-winning economist Elinor Ostrom.
That said, it is hard to see how these efforts, laudable though they are, could
create the impetus needed to elicit an effective response to the genuine and grave
dangers of climate change. Fragmented initiatives can produce only partial results.
And climate is a global public good: one tonne of carbon dioxide emitted in Beijing
has exactly the same effect on global warming as does one tonne of carbon dioxide
emitted in Montréal or Paris. 
To avoid having decreased emissions by some countries (or regions and cities)
cancelled out by increased emissions in other countries (or localities), we need a
truly global agreement. What is more, countries and businesses will be afraid to do
more as long as they have no assurance that their competitors will play by the same
climate rules. Only an international agreement can give them that assurance.
For these reasons, necessary efforts to mitigate climate change must form part of
an international plan; otherwise we will not achieve the objective of limiting
global warming to about 2° C. In other words, without an international agreement,
8. See also A New Direction for Climate Policy After the Crash of 2009 (the Hartwell Paper), Oxford University Press
and London School of Economics, 2010; Amory Lovins, Reinventing Fire: Bold Business Solutions in the New Energy
Era (ISBN 978-1603583718), 2011; and David G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock, New York, Cambridge University
Press, 2011.
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such an agreement is essentially impossible and abandoning all hope of orderly
climate change management, we would rather propose a new endeavour.
In our view, the best international co-ordination instrument we can establish to
combat climate change is a global carbon price signal. We therefore propose that
negotiations focus on this essential objective.
In Durban, delegates agreed to set up a working group to identify solutions for
closing the gap between national emission reduction targets and the 2º C limit on
increased global warming. This working group will accomplish nothing if it wastes
its efforts asking individual countries to boost their emission reduction targets: that
idea was tried after Cancún in 2010, without success. We have to try something
else, something new. More usefully, this working group could propose a global
carbon price signal.
That is the idea we will now explore.
3. Toward a harmonized, flexible global carbon price signal
What we propose is neither to maintain the status quo nor to start from scratch;
neither to replicate Kyoto, nor to assemble a mismatched climate policy
patchwork.
As a middle way, we propose a globally harmonized but nationally flexible
climate policy, designed to stimulate implementation of a broad range of robust,
consistent national low carbon strategies such as regulations, clean energy subsi-
dies, international sectoral agreements by industry, land development plans,
carbon markets, etc. 
In this regard, we must first acknowledge that, despite all its shortcomings, the
present system has two great strengths: it promotes a climate target that is global
but takes into account individual countries’ development levels (with references to
a “Common But Differentiated Responsibility” and “comparable effort”); and it is
based on “flexibility mechanisms” (economic instruments) that foster the transi-
tion to environmentally-sustainable economies and have eventuated in, most
notably, the European Union Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS), Europe’s carbon
market and the world’s largest-ever pollution market. We must build on these
two strengths while addressing their shortcomings. 
Here is what we propose: countries would each make a commitment to intro-
duce, in their respective jurisdictions, a carbon price aligned with a
scientifically-validated international standard, in order for the world to achieve or
at least come as close as possible to the objective of keeping global warming below
2º C over pre-industrial era levels. 
Stéphane Dion and Éloi Laurent8Governments would be free to invest, as they see fit, revenues from the carbon
emission levy and from the corresponding elimination of fossil energy subsidies.
For example, they could invest in research and development in clean energy and
public transportation. They could also choose to address social inequalities with
respect to access to energy, for example by offsetting increased fossil fuel costs for
low-income individuals and families.
Developed countries would finally be required to set aside part of their revenues
to help developing countries introduce policies to mitigate emissions, adapt facili-
ties and create carbon sinks (by means of reforestation, for example). The
contributions of individual developed countries would be based on what their
respective GHG emissions represent relative to the total emissions of all developed
countries. 
This simple plan would have many advantages and would address most
problems we have identified in the present system. First of all, a price signal is the
best economic instrument for reducing the costs of low carbon transition, and is
thus a much more effective incentive than individual targets. Setting a carbon price
would orient energy choices by internalizing the costs of pollution and climate
change. As a concrete example, the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP) proposes increasing the share of clean and renewable energies from their
2005 level of 2.5% of primary energy to 9% in 20209. It also assumes a significant
drop in the use of coal without carbon dioxide capture10. Changes like these are
not affordable if GHG emissions remain free of charge.
Applied worldwide, a price signal is the best instrument for addressing problems
of international competitiveness (that take the form of carbon leakage, imported
emissions and climate dumping), thus addressing the present system’s lack of
transparency. As long as individual countries are afraid that carbon price-setting
within their respective jurisdictions will scare businesses and investments away to
countries where carbon dioxide emissions are still free of charge, carbon pricing
will never reach the desired levels. As long as individual countries hope that other
countries will do the job for them, as long as they can take advantage of other
countries’ efforts while doing as little as possible themselves, as long as they can
wave the ready excuse “I’ll do it when my neighbour does it” – in short, as long as
they can be climate free-riders – our efforts will fall far short of the mark. 
The way to put an end to carbon leakage and climate free-riding is to establish a
global carbon price signal: this will allow countries and businesses to see the advan-
tages of acting instead of taking the path of least resistance. It will be in their
interest to lower their carbon emissions and thus to lower the price they pay for
carbon. As soon as they can all realize that emissions reduction is in their best inte-
rest, efforts to that end can be seen as opportunities to enhance economic
9. UNEP, Bridging the Emission Gap: A UNEP Synthesis Report, November 2011, p. 11.
10. UNEP, Bridging the Emission Gap: A UNEP Synthesis Report, November 2011, p. 32.
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for technological innovation. As well, a global carbon price signal would provide a
clear point of reference for verifying compliance of individual countries with their
own commitments.
A global carbon price signal, then, is a practical, feasible way to address the
problems of incentive, inclusion, transparency and eventually – we may hope –
 effectiveness we have identified in the present system.
How high should this price signal be set? The objective is to set a price that
makes research cost-effective and results in low-carbon solutions, thus acting as a
catalyst for the full range of action needed to combat climate change. According
to UNEP, measures to be taken by 2020 to keep us on track for the 2º C limit on
increased global warming – the “450 ppm scenario” – have a median value
of $38 per tonne of carbon dioxide equivalent11. According to Nordhaus12, the
optimum carbon tax would amount to $42 per tonne in 2015, rising gradually
to $90 in 2050, and $220 in 2100. The fourth report by the Intergovernmental
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) called for a price of between $50 and $100 per
tonne between 2010 and 2030 for the 450 ppm scenario to be possible. The IEA
situates this price at between $95 and $120 per tonne by 203013.
While these options vary, there is broad consensus that this price signal should
rise gradually and not peak immediately: the idea is to set a price trajectory, not a
single fixed price. 
Should this price trajectory be the same for all countries? Although theoretically
a single global price signal would be preferable, there is consensus that not every
country has the same capacity to deal with a single price. According to the plan
proposed by the IEA14, in Europe the price per tonne of carbon emission from elec-
tricity, industry and aviation should be $45 in 2020, rising to $95 (in constant
dollars) in 2030, and $120 in 2035. The price in other developed countries should
also rise to $120 by 2035, but on a slower trajectory than that of Europe. Emerging
economies including Russia should adopt a price of $10 per tonne in 2020,
$65 in 2030, and $95 in 2035.
Of course, these basic points are open and negotiable. Indeed, they should be
debated at the highest scientific level. Personally, we see no reason why all deve-
loped countries could not sustain the same trajectory as Europe. We also
recommend uniform application of the price signal across all sectors of the
economy, including transportation.
11. UNEP, Bridging the Emission Gap: A UNEP Synthesis Report, November 2011, p. 30.
12. Nordhaus, W., Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming Policies, Yale University Press, 2008.
13. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011, p. 49.
14. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011, p. 66.
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2035) may seem high, that is the price to pay if we want to combat climate change
effectively. In fact, even at this level, results are not guaranteed. The IEA’s
450 ppm scenario is based on a certain number of assumptions, some of which
may appear quite optimistic. For example, it assumes that carbon dioxide capture
and storage, a technology that is still underdeveloped, will account for 18% of fore-
cast emission reductions from 2010 to 203515. One thing is certain, however: if
GHG emissions remain free of charge, industry will never invest the billions of
dollars required to develop and deploy this technology. 
Could individual countries’ adopting different price signal trajectories perpe-
tuate carbon leakage? With a price of $45 per tonne in developed countries and
$10 per tonne in emerging economies in 2020, will high-carbon activities continue
to migrate to developing countries? Although this risk cannot be entirely ruled out,
we consider it to be moderate and controllable if price convergence is well esta-
blished from the outset and well respected thereafter. If, as the IEA proposes, the
price spread is limited to approximately $25 per tonne in 2035 ($120 per tonne for
developed countries, $95 for emerging economies), the risk of carbon leakage can
be contained. After all, today, a tonne of carbon emissions costs between $20
and $30 more in Europe than in America, and there is no carbon leakage between
these two continents16.  Many factors other than the cost of carbon, such as labour
cost and quality, infrastructure and political stability, will continue to influence
investment location17.
A final point: GHG emissions are highly concentrated in a few countries. These
are the countries that must adopt a harmonized price signal policy. Two countries
combined, the United States and China, produce 41% of GHG emissions;
10 countries produce two-thirds of these emissions; and the 20 biggest GHG-emit-
ting countries produce 80% of the total. The objective should be to have all these
large GHG emitters – let’s call them the “GHG 20” – accept a price bracket and a
clear price signal trajectory.
4. Levying, acceptance, enforcement and legal status
4.1. Levying through mandatory results and independent instruments
The world’s central banks enjoy the privilege of independent objectives or inde-
pendent instruments, sometimes both, to reach their inflation targets. In the
system we propose, countries are assigned a price signal objective but are free to
choose the means they deploy to achieve this objective: they are subject to manda-
15. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011, p. 205.
16. David G. Victor, Global Warming Gridlock, New York, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 51.
17. Michael Skou Anderson and Paul Ekins, dir., Carbon Energy Taxation: Lessons from Europe, New York, Oxford
University Press, 2009.
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trajectory), but they enjoy independent instruments.
In terms of instruments, the simplest approach would be for countries to make
use of tax policies, given that a tax is the instrument best designed to ensure the
certainty and predictability required for levying a carbon price signal. As well, with
a tax, compliance with the global carbon price signal would be relatively easy to
verify. Nearly all countries are members of the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
which receives information on countries’ tax policies and thus could evaluate each
country's application of a carbon price signal. The IMF would also be able to verify
that countries did not indirectly re-subsidize fossil fuel energy.
In this way, countries would levy a tax on carbon and use the corresponding
revenues to fund their priorities. They could choose to tax emissions at the time of
fossil fuel consumption, or during the production process. They could reform their
tax policies to tax fossil fuels by carbon content. For example, the present practice
is for governments to tax coal very little18.  If tax levels corresponded to carbon
content, the reverse would happen: coal would be taxed at a higher rate than oil,
which would be taxed at a higher rate than natural gas. Although this “climatiza-
tion” of national tax policies does present technical difficulties, these difficulties
are not insurmountable19.
The other way to establish a carbon price signal is through the allocation of
emission quotas (cap-and-trade or carbon market). Although more easily feasible
politically, the main disadvantage of this system is that the price signal tends to
fluctuate significantly, depending on the market and the volume of emission rights
issued20. In addition to carbon or quota price fluctuations, this system presents
other complications, for example multiple exceptions, vested interests and offset-
ting credits, emission quotas allocated free of charge, and exemptions for entire
sectors of the economy. This type of system is so complicated that, at the end of the
day, we may no longer have a very clear idea of the actual carbon price.
That said, the European Union has already and successfully introduced a carbon
cap-and-trade system, and other countries have done so or are considering doing
so. It would be unrealistic to ask these countries to dismantle these systems and put
all their eggs in the tax policy basket
18. Érick Lachapelle, “The Hidden Factor in Climate Policy: Implicit Carbon Taxes”, Sustainable Prosperity,
February 2011.
19. Hohan Albrecht, “The Use of Consumption Taxes to Re-Launch Green Tax Reforms”, International Review of
Law and Economics, 2006, 26: 88-113; Akira Yokoyama et al., “Green Tax Reform: Converting Implicit Carbon
Taxes to a Pure Carbon Tax”, Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, 2000, 3: 1-20; Laurent, Eloi and Jacques Le
Cacheux , An Ever Less Carbonated Union? Towards a better European taxation against climate change, 2009, Notre
Europe ; Laurent, Eloi et and Jacques Le Cacheux, Réforme de la fiscalité du carbone dans l’Union européenne : les
options en présence, Revue de l’OFCE, April 2011.
20. Éloi Laurent and Jacques Le Cacheux, op. cit. 
Stéphane Dion and Éloi Laurent12In any case, these instruments are evolving toward mixed carbon tarification
systems that include taxation features such as minimum pricing and emissions
quota auctioning21. In these systems, what is crucial is limiting price volatility. In
fact, the international agreement we propose introduces a great deal of price
certainty, a feature that allows public and private-sector decision-makers to better
plan investments that will favour low-carbon solutions.
The European Union is counting on the potential linkages that can be esta-
blished between its system and the carbon markets certain countries – Australia,
China – are planning to put in place. It is hoped that coordinating these various
markets will, in time, result in a true world carbon market and, thus, the emission
of a truly global carbon signal.
But at the present rate, the least that can be said is that this approach could take
a very long time to show results, perhaps decades. Furthermore, its ability to curb
climate change efficiently is not certain. That is why we propose to speed up the
process significantly by beginning negotiations on a carbon price signal immedia-
tely. On this basis, there will be a great incentive for countries wishing to proceed
with cap and trade systems to make them efficient enough to reduce their CO2
emission tonnage and thus, the price they have to pay. These countries will also see
that it is in their interest to make their systems mutually compatible in order to
reap the benefits of interconnection. Establishing a carbon price signal can only
facilitate and hasten worldwide carbon market interconnection, something the
European Union is bound to seek within the present system for a long time and, we
believe, in vain.
In pricing carbon emissions through a tax or a cap and trade, of course we must
gradually eliminate fossil fuel energy subsidies (since they counteract the effect of
pricing): doing one without doing the other would be intrinsically contradictory.
Thus countries would each make a commitment, in accordance with their respec-
tive price signal trajectory, to gradually eliminating their fossil fuel energy
subsidies, the total of which amounted to $312 billion in 2009, $409 billion
in 2010, and which could be as high as $660 billion in 2020 if no changes are
made22. 
Eliminating fossil fuel energy subsidies, which in 2010 were 12 times as high as
renewable energy subsidies, would have secondary benefits, not only environmen-
tally but also economically and socially. Fossil fuel energy subsidies are a harmful
social policy. The World Bank estimates that, in 2009, approximately 80% of bene-
fits from fossil fuel subsidies23 went to the 40% that make up the richest
21. See Robert Joshi, “‘Hybrid’ Carbon Pricing: Issues to Consider When Carbon Taxes and Cap-and-Trade Systems
Interact”, Sustainable Prosperity, 2009; also: Samuel Fankhauser, Cameron Hepburn and Jisung Park, “Combining
Multiple Climate Policy Instruments: How Not to Do It”, Centre for Climate Change Economics and Policy,
February 2011; and, again, Éloi Laurent and Jacques Le Cacheux, 2009 and 2011, op.cit.
22. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011.
23. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011.
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benefited the poorest population quintile: “They are an inefficient means of assisting
the poor; other direct forms of welfare support would cost much less” 25.
In terms of economic policy, fossil fuel energy subsidies are an outdated,
senseless policy that encourages overconsumption, hastens resource depletion,
distorts market signals, places a heavy burden on governments, discourages invest-
ment in energy infrastructures, and stands in the way of the adoption of more
environmentally-friendly energy practices and processes by energy-intensive
industries. Furthermore, it makes little economic sense to waste scarce and precious
public financial resource to support what is probably the record profit-making
industry in the history of capitalism and will continue to be for a number of years
given the prospect of fossil fuel price increase.
The international agreement on carbon pricing must also ensure agreement on
the pace of eliminating fossil fuel energy subsidies. Fuel price increases that are too
sudden, ill-designed, and not immediately offset by substantial, well-targeted
social transfers to benefit low-income citizens could meet strong public resistance.
Nigeria provides a recent example. That said, according to the OECD, eliminating
these subsidies, even unilaterally, would benefit most countries economically26.
The IEA proposes that all importing countries eliminate these subsidies by 2020,
and that exporting countries proceed more slowly, eliminating most of these subsi-
dies by 203527.
4.2. Fostering acceptance through the justice principle and compensation 
mechanisms
The justice principle and compensation mechanisms are both indispensable,
first at the international level. We noted from the outset that, for developing
countries, this harmonized carbon price signal would be easier to accept than abso-
lute, mandatory GHG emission targets. For emerging economies, with annual
growth rates of between 6% and 10%, an absolute emission reduction target may
look more like an obstacle to economic expansion, while a harmonized carbon
price signal that is adopted by these countries’ competitors and the revenues of
which is for them to use as they see fit, opens up much more interesting options. It
is nevertheless true that imposing such a price signal could have more negative
impacts on wellbeing in developing countries than in developed countries. 
Thus we must ensure that there are international compensation mechanisms. In
the name of the “Common But Differentiated Responsibility” principle, developed
countries would be required to set aside part of their revenue to help developing
24. “Climate Change and the World Bank Group”, World Bank Report, World Bank, Washington DC, 2009.
25. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011. p.32.
26. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011. p.32.
27. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011, p. 34.
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impacts and create carbon sinks. This requirement would solve the problem of
funding the annual injection of $100 billion into the Green Climate Fund that
developed countries agreed to provide starting in 2020. This amount could even be
increased. We propose that the proportion of individual developed countries’
contributions correspond to the proportion their respective GHG emissions repre-
sent of total emissions from all developed countries (on a current or cumulative
basis). The lower a country’s emission level, the lower its share of the financial
effort, which would be a further emission reduction incentive.
Furthermore, negotiations for a carbon price signal will hasten the implementa-
tion and coordination of robust and functional carbon markets, which in turn will
channel important private investments toward such forest management and
carbon sink mechanisms as REDD – an objective on which countries such as Brazil
are highly insistent.
One thing is certain: without such a transfer mechanism our plan could never
work, because it would violate the fundamental principles of climate justice. The
poorest and most vulnerable countries are not responsible for their misfortune.
They suffer the consequences of climate warming, but they did not cause it. In fact,
in December 2011 in Durban, a group of developing countries led by India, China,
Brazil and Saudi Arabia expressed their opposition to the idea of an international
carbon tax, pointing out that, in the absence of a financial compensation mecha-
nism, this tax would work to the detriment of poor countries28.
At present, negotiations on the annual injection of $100 billion into the Green
Climate Fund have come to a halt. In Durban, some developed countries claimed
that a mechanism for identifying funding sources was premature. It is quite
possible that the only way to kick-start these negotiations again is to direct them
toward setting a carbon price signal, accompanied by the compensation mecha-
nism we propose. In Durban, a working group was set up to consider how to
inject $100 billion per year into the Green Climate Fund starting in 2020. It would
be desirable for this working group to examine closely the possibility of obtaining
these funds via a world carbon price signal.
Justice principles and compensation mechanisms are also indispensable at the
national level. We should first emphasize that adopting a carbon price signal
system would have significant secondary benefits, notably: more competitive clean
and renewable energy, a more substantial and more diversified energy portfolio,
energy savings, reduced local and trans-border air pollution, and reduced pollu-
tion-induced morbidity and mortality rates. Furthermore, governments can decide,
for example, to lower individual and corporate income tax substantially, thus
stimulating their economies by alleviating the tax burden on productive activities
28. IEA, World Energy Outlook, 2011, p.211.
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with this revenue is to fund fossil fuel energy, as the international agreement must
clearly state.
Yet, governments will undoubtedly need to use part of their carbon revenue to
address social inequalities. Since the main issue with a carbon tax has to do with
political acceptability, that is political economy, it will be appropriate to plan for
social compensation. A new energy tax, even offset by lower existing income tax,
will necessarily face strong public resistance, particularly among citizens who are
the least well-off – as one author of this paper is in a good position to know, since
his attempt to convince Canadians of the wisdom of such a tax reform in the 2008
federal election was unsuccessful29. Thus governments might do well to use part of
their newfound tax revenue to offset all – if not more – of the increased costs of
fossil fuel energy for low-income individuals and families.
4.3. The issue of enforcement: credibility principle, possible border carbon taxes
One sensitive issue remains to be examined: what should be done about defaul-
ting countries, that is, countries that fail to meet their commitments or refuse to be
parties to the international agreement we propose? In our view, the response lies in
the rules of international trade.
The international agreement would allow countries to levy border taxes on
products from countries that do not establish a carbon price signal in accordance
with the international standard. Of course, this solution would be a last resort, to
be applied after the usual warnings have been issued (to the extent possible, we
need to avoid having these retaliatory measures degenerate into a "carbon trade
war"). 
The present trade rules already provide latitude for factoring in compliance with
climate-related trade practices. In the foreword to a report on trade and climate
change, UNEP Executive Director Achim Steiner and World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) Director General Pascal Lamy note that “there is considerable scope
and flexibility under WTO rules for addressing climate change at the national
level”30. For example, on 21 December 2011, the European Court of Justice ruled
that the European Union was entitled to levy a carbon tax on non-European
companies arriving in or leaving from European countries, since European
countries are required to pay this tax. 
The WTO and UNEP point out that countries already make border tax adjust-
ments on all sorts of products, with various objectives: reducing cigarette or
alcohol use, promoting human health, reducing risks associated with asbestos,
reducing air pollution resulting from gasoline consumption, and protecting plants,
29. In 2010, author Éloi Laurent saw the French government abandon a carbon taxation project, in the face of
strong public opposition.
30. Ludivine Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change: WTO-UNEP Report, 2009, p. v.
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on the imported product needs to be equivalent to the tax imposed on the “like”
domestic product”32.
If a country complies with the international agreement on climate, things are
simple: that country is immune from these corrective border measures since it
applies the agreed-upon carbon price signal to its own products before exporting
them. With a defaulting country, things are more complicated. What should the
penalty amount to?
Of course, at the border it can be difficult to assess the volume of GHG emissions
included in a product because this volume depends on a great many factors, such
as the source of the energy used and the production process. At this point, “some
sort of certification or labelling as to the relevant aspects of the production process
used” may be used33; if the manufacturer does not provide this information, the
product may be taxed on the assumption that it was manufactured using the
predominant method of production or the best available technology (in the past,
the GATT panel accepted the use of this method in the case of a tax on chemicals
levied by the United States).
In any case, the international agreement we propose must send a clear message
to all large GHG emitters: if you do not levy a carbon price on your products before
exporting them, other countries will do it for you – and will keep the resulting
revenue. In this way, it will be in each country’s interest to comply with the inter-
national agreement, to levy a carbon price on its own emissions, and to use the
resulting revenue as it sees fit.
4.4. The issue of legal status
One last point regards the legal status of such an agreement on a global carbon
price signal. We have assumed that the decision-makers of all the world’s countries
are acting in good faith. They are sincere in making a commitment to limit
warming to below a level at which scientists predict dangerous climate disruption.
We therefore assume that countries believe climate change mitigation action is
necessary.
Of course, if that is not the case, then no international agreement is possible. For
example, if come Fall the United States were to elect a President and a Congress
that do not believe in the threat of human-induced climate change, the objective
of an international agreement would be impossible to achieve.
31. Ludivine Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change: WTO-UNEP Report, 2009, p. 107.
32. Ludivine Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change: WTO-UNEP Report, 2009, p. 103.
33. Ludivine Tamiotti et al., Trade and Climate Change: WTO-UNEP Report, 2009, pp. 101-102.
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country’s Senate to ratify a treaty. For this reason, it would be more prudent to aim
for an international agreement that does not have treaty status. 
Such an agreement is entirely possible with the model we propose. Following
a Conference of the Parties (COP) to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, the delegates would issue a joint statement of agreement on the
carbon price signal trajectory that each country is committed to follow. It would
then be the responsibility of each government to have this price ratified by legisla-
tion or in a budget. 
The important thing is that each country be able to adopt the agreed-on price
signal with the assurance that their competitors will do the same. Ideally, this assu-
rance should be guaranteed in a treaty. In practice, an international agreement
would be more realistic.
5. Conclusion
There is no doubt that international negotiations on climate must continue. At
the same time, however, we must be daring and inject into these negotiations a
new idea that can give us the impetus we lack: adopting a harmonized, flexible
carbon price signal system.
In this way, the world would have available an instrument that is vital to its
sustainable development. At last, carbon emitters would be required to pay the
environmental price for their actions. Consumers and manufacturers would have
an incentive to choose lower-carbon-content goods and services and to invest in
new emission-reducing forms of technology.
To achieve this objective, we cannot throw the past away and start over: we
must build on what has been accomplished. However, we no longer have the
luxury of waiting out bad solutions: we must pick up the pace considerably, and we
must change our approach. 
There is a general feeling that the Cancún-Durban fabric is so fragile that we
should not dare alter a single thread. We realize that, as a result, some observers
will consider our proposal hard to negotiate or simply unrealistic. But what is the
alternative? The years 2010 and 2011 were among the hottest ever recorded, while
carbon dioxide emissions reached their highest historical level, despite the world-
wide recession. The world met for COP 17 in Africa, a continent whose entire
eastern half is ravaged by drought. The United States had the most expensive year
it has ever experienced in terms of economic consequence of weather disasters. The
government of China, in its Second National Assessment Report on Climate Change,
recently acknowledged that warming constitutes a threat to its economic growth
and development, makes its drinking water more scarce, lowers its crops, and
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ratchet up our efforts to match the challenge?
We are firmly convinced that there is a policy that can lead to global sustainable
development. Yes, it is possible to move from self-destructive development to
sustainable development. But we must move ahead without delay: given the
present pace of global warming and our limp response so far, each passing year can
only make indispensable changes even harder.
At the moment, Europe is trying to strengthen its carbon market and link it with
other markets. The United States, Canada, Japan and a few other developed
countries are refusing to strengthen their climate policies as long as other large
emitters refuse to follow suit. And given their strong economic growth, China,
India and other emerging countries are loathe to adopt absolute reduction targets.
The only way to unfreeze these negotiations before it is too late is to re-orient them
toward the establishment of a carbon price signal. 
The biggest carbon emitters (the “GHG 20”) should adopt a carbon price signal,
harmonized in principle but flexible in practice. What better place to undertake
this approach than in Rio, right where the problem – for which this instrument is
the solution – was recognized by the international community 20 years ago?
